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This paper empirically investigates the extent of investor moral hazard associated with IMF 
bailouts by analyzing the responses of sovereign bond spreads to the changes in the 
perceived probability of IMF bailouts of countries undergoing financial crisis. We do not 
find strong evidence that the extent of investor moral hazard changed after the non-bailout 
of Russia in August 1998 that signaled a modification to IMF intervention policy. In 
contrast, we find evidence that investor moral hazard is intensified for those countries that 
have stronger political connections to the IMF and that are thereby more likely to be bailed 
out by the IMF. This pattern prevailed even after the Russian crisis.   
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Over the last decade, the size and frequency of international financial disturbances has 
continued to increase and the role of the IMF as a “crisis manager” has expanded to meet 
these challenges.    The IMF has mobilized ever-larger rescue packages and become more 
deeply involved in domestic macroeconomic policies and structural reform in developing 
countries.  
While the IMF’s lending during the crises helps to avoid crashes, it is often claimed 
by critics that the Fund’s role of a “quasi-lender of last resort” through its repeated 
intervention with large-scale financial support packages in the international financial 
markets creates moral hazard.    The prospect of future IMF bailouts allows investors to 
lend excessively to member countries at interest rates that do not adequately reflect 
underlying risks and encourages borrowers to behave in imprudent ways.     
The purpose of this paper is to assess the extent of moral hazard associated with 
IMF bailouts.    To date, there have only been few formal empirical studies on the impact of 
IMF bailouts on moral hazard and their conclusions have been at best mixed (see the survey 
in section 2).    This paper attempts to investigate the presence of investor moral hazard by 
empirically examining whether IMF bailouts encourage excessive risk taking by investors.   
Our study builds on previous empirical literature, and in particular extends the 
framework of Dell’Ariccia et al. (2002).    Dell’Ariccia et al. focus on events such as the 
Russian default that supposedly signaled major changes in the policy stances of the 
international financial institutions towards providing loans to crisis countries.    If these 
events occur exogenously, then any change in the behavior of investors, reflected in interests and bond spreads due to changes in perceived probability of bailout of crisis 
countries, will indicate whether moral hazard becomes aggravated or mitigated following 
the events.    Dell’Ariccia et al. find some mixed evidence; namely that moral hazard 
prevailed before the Russian crisis but not in the relation with other events such as the 
Mexican and Asian crises. 
An implicit assumption made by Dell’Ariccia et al. and in most other studies is that 
investor moral hazard is a phenomenon taking place across all emerging countries.    We 
believe, however, that the degree of prevailing moral hazard might differ across countries 
depending on country specifics.    Especially, if a selected group of countries are more 
likely to be bailed out by the IMF than other countries, then the moral hazard and any 
adverse effects from it would be concentrated within the group.    In this paper we propose 
another test procedure that delves into this possibility.    We find that the degree of investor 
moral hazard actually differs across countries.    Especially, we find evidence that investor 
moral hazard is intensified on the countries that are more likely to be bailed out by the IMF.   
While the extent of investor moral hazard could change across all countries following the 
events that signal significant overall IMF policy modifications, the expected size of IMF 
bailouts determined by a member country’s political connections to the IMF and by various 
country characteristics plays an important role as well. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.    In section II, we define the 
concept of moral hazard triggered by the IMF and survey the previous empirical studies on 
it.  Section  III  introduces  the  test procedure and applies it to detect prevailing investor 
moral hazard across countries.    Concluding remarks follow in Section IV.  
II. IMF Lending and Moral hazard   
 
1. The concept of moral hazard   
 
Moral hazard is a term that originates from analyzing the effects of insurance.    A typical 
situation is that when a person insures an asset, the insured may have less incentive to 
maintain the asset properly.    This is because insurance reduces the incentives for the 
insured party to take preventive actions.    Typically, the behavior of the insured is 
unobservable by the insurance company or too difficult to contract on directly. 
In recent discussions on the role of the IMF and reforms toward a new international 
financial architecture, moral hazard has been a critical issue.    The question is whether the 
availability of financial rescue from the international financial institutions like the IMF in 
the situation of crises encourages lenders and borrowers to behave irresponsibly in ways 
that may make a crisis more likely. 
To the extent that the prospect of future IMF bailouts is like the provision of 
insurance to both borrowers and lenders, it reduces their motivations to take preventive 
actions.    Anticipating that the perceived default risk associated with international lending 
is diminished, investors are likely to lend excessively to member countries at interest rates 
that do not adequately reflect the underlying risks.    On the other hand, the expectation of 
IMF’s official rescue encourages debtors to behave in imprudent ways.    Excessive 
international capital flows and imprudent domestic policies will likely increase the probability of a crisis. 
    An IMF loan differs from an insurance contract in several aspects.    Insurance 
contracts render permanent transfer of funds from the insurer to the insured on realization 
of the risk.    In contrast, IMF financial support is not a permanent transfer and comes as a 
loan to be repaid with interest.    Nevertheless, even if the transfer is temporary, the interest 
rate of IMF subsidized loans is much lower than the rate at which a country could borrow 
from private capital markets during a crisis.    Hence, the “insured benefit” from the IMF 
lending might be sufficiently substantial to entail “debtor moral hazard”.    From the 
perspective of investors, it is clear that IMF’s limited intervention does not provide a 
“complete guarantee” of the debt service.    Nevertheless, the increased frequency and size 
of IMF financial support in recent years seem to indicate there exists a significant distortion 
of incentives to investors, which can cause “creditor moral hazard”. 
Unlike insurance contracts, IMF lending helps to mitigate the “real hazard” of a 
crisis.    The presence of short-term liquidity support from the IMF in the event of a 
liquidity crisis can help to reduce the probability of runs on a country’s international reserve 
or currency.    The IMF-supported programs might reduce the severity, such as output 
losses, of a financial crisis, and thus lead to improved prospects for honoring debt contract.   
However, by mitigating the real hazard of a crisis, IMF lending aggravates investor moral 
hazard.    A decrease in perceived risk can lead investors to undertake riskier and larger-
scale  lending.   
When IMF lending decreases real hazard and simultaneously increases moral 
hazard, separation between the two effects becomes a critical issue.    For example, the presence of IMF financial support can increase international lending to borrowers through a 
decrease in real hazard of a crisis or an increase in moral hazard, or both.    This 
complication makes it difficult to assess the net benefit of IMF intervention (Rogoff, 2002).   
The role of IMF lending on decreasing real hazard is clearly welfare-improving.    If real 
hazard benefits outweigh moral hazard costs, then moral hazard in IMF loans would not be 
a big concern (Jeanne and Zettelmeyer, 2001).   
 
2. Previous empirical literature   
 
The central issue is whether the moral hazard supposedly caused by the IMF’s intervention 
is actually present and, if so, is quantitatively important. Kenneth Rogoff, the former 
director of the IMF’s Research Department, asks “where is the empirical evidence that 
moral hazard in IMF lending is important, at least in this crude form?” (Rogoff, 2002)   
The investigations into whether IMF financing leads to moral hazard encounter a number of 
difficulties.    First, it is hard to measure moral hazard precisely.    In general, we cannot 
directly observe the extent of ‘excessive’ risk-taking behavior of creditors and debtors that are 
induced by the IMF intervention.    Second, it is difficult to separate the effects of IMF 
intervention from those of other factors.    IMF intervention itself is an endogenous choice 
that depends on economic and political circumstances surrounding the global community as 
well as member countries.    For example, the increased frequencies of IMF intervention, 
rather than being introduced exogenously, can be a response to an increased incidence of 
crisis.    In order to disentangle the effects of IMF programs from those of other factors, we have to compare the outcome with the presence of IMF support to the counterfactual event 
that would otherwise have occurred.    It is difficult conceptually and practically to construct 
this counterfactual result.    Considering these difficulties in the empirical practices, it is not 
surprising that there have been few systematic empirical studies.   
Recently, there have been new developments of strategies to detect moral hazard.
1  
A number of recent empirical studies in this area, including Zhang (1999), Lane and Philips 
(2000), Kamin (2002), and Dell’Ariccia et al. (2002), investigate whether expectations of 
IMF intervention influence interest rates and bond spreads - which are measures of the change 
in perceived investor risk.    The hypothesis is that an IMF loan decreases the downside risks 
of default and thus encourages investors’ reckless lending.    Therefore, the increased IMF 
intervention should lower the equilibrium cost of borrowing between debtors and creditors.   
In addition, most recent studies focus on particular IMF (non)intervention events to get 
around the endogeneity of the IMF program.    These studies focus on whether an 
exogenous change in IMF’s lending practice induces changes in moral hazard behavior.   
The moral hazard behavior is easiest to detect when there are exogenous changes in the 
incentive schemes.   
Zhang (1999) examines if the Mexican IMF packages in 1995 aggravated investor 
moral hazard.    Since the spreads on emerging market bonds were actually lowered after 
the Mexican IMF packages, it was argued that investor behavior became less prudent 
because of raised expectation of bailouts for crisis countries in the future.  Zhang  formally 
tested this hypothesis by setting up an equation for bond spreads based on fundamentals 
†††††††††††††††††††††
1  See Dreher (2004) for a broad survey.   and international capital market conditions and including a post-Mexican dummy as an 
additional explanatory variable.    He finds that the coefficient on the dummy variable is 
positive and insignificant and interprets that the observed decline in spreads is a reaction to 
the increased liquidity in international capital markets and improved fundamentals rather 
than being a consequence of moral hazard.    Similarly, by comparing bond spreads over 
recent years after 1998 with those prior to the Mexican crisis, Kamin (2002) also finds that 
moral hazard has not been present in recent years.    Lane and Philips (2000) broaden the 
cases and consider the behavior of spreads around the time of 22 IMF interventions in the 
1990s. They find that few of these cases led to a significant decrease in spreads, which is 
considered as evidence against the presence of moral hazard.†
On the other hand, there are a few studies that may support the presence of investor 
moral hazard.    Eichengreen and Mody (2001), based on a huge number of primary-market 
bond spreads between 1991 and 1999, find that the presence of an IMF program 
significantly increases the probability of bond issuance and lowers the spreads of the 
country with the program.    They interpret this as evidence for the "catalyzing" effect of 
IMF programs because investors perceive conclusions of IMF programs as a commitment 
for reforms, and also suggest it can be reconciled with the investor moral hazard view.
2 
Dell’Ariccia et al. (2002) also examine if the IMF’s nonbailout of Russia in August 1998 
decreased investor moral hazard.    They find evidence that sovereign bond spreads in 
†††††††††††††††††††††
Mody and Saravia (2003) show further results that the effect of IMF programs on bond issuance and 
spreads becomes insignificant for the countries with weak fundamentals such as export growth volatility, 
reserve-to-import ratio and debt-to-GDP ratio, or which have been in IMF programs for a number of years.   
This pattern of IMF program effects does not seem to match well with the moral hazard view.    The 
endogeneity problem of IMF programs seems to prevail more significantly in these studies which focus on all 
IMF program episodes instead of a more-exogenously-held event.    See the discussions below. 
 emerging markets have risen in 1999 and 2000 compared to those in the pre-Russian crisis 
period, and conclude that investor moral hazard has been mitigated after the Russian debt 
crisis.
3    
In general, however, tests based on market spreads are subject to identification 
problems.    As pointed out above, there is an intrinsic difficulty of disentangling the effects 
of the IMF interventions in question from those of other circumstances.    For example, the 
IMF’s bailouts of East Asia in 1997 probably came together with the general reassessments 
of risks in emerging market economies, as investors realized that even countries with strong 
macroeconomic fundamentals were vulnerable to large-scale capital account crises due to 
investor panic or crisis contagion.    Hence, the perceived risk must have increased, which 
tended to offset the reduction of market spread due to moral hazard.    In addition, IMF 
interventions might help to mitigate the “real hazard” of a crisis.    If this were the case, 
IMF supports encourage investors to lend more and debtors to borrow more, which could 
make it hard to isolate the effect of creditor moral hazard on market spreads.    Moreover, 
the change in market spreads might reflect both the changes in investor moral hazard and 
debtor moral hazard.    Changes in borrower moral hazard are in principle controlled by the 
change in country fundamentals.    The expectation of financial rescue by the IMF 
discourages debtors from behaving prudently, and is thereby likely to deteriorate country 
fundamentals.    It is not clear that the empirical tests control all important country 
fundamentals in the specification.   
†††††††††††††††††††††
3  Dell’Ariccia et al.’s approach is distinguished from most other studies in that they focus on the sensitivity of 
spreads with respect to fundamentals rather than the level of spreads.    See Section III for a more detailed 
explanation of their approach. ㄰
A few studies such as Kamin and von Kleist (1999) and Dell’Ariccia et al. (2002) 
attempt to isolate the investor moral hazard from other factors in influencing market 
spreads by examining changes in the sensitivity of spreads with respect to fundamentals, 
rather than changes in the level of spreads, before and after an IMF intervention.    An 
increase in investor moral hazard implies that investors pay less attention to differences in 
country characteristics, thereby leading to smaller slope coefficients on country 
fundamentals in the regressions for spreads.    For example, Dell’Ariccia et al. (2002) find 
that the Russian default has increased the sensitivity with which spreads react to 
fundamentals and conclude that investor moral hazard decreased after the Russian crisis.   
This type of test seems to isolate the effects of investor moral hazard from those of debtor 
moral hazard, by controlling the change in fundamentals and assessing the changes in 
slopes.    In so far as mitigation of real hazard is solely reflected in a general decline in 
spreads and improvement in fundamentals, this approach can also disentangle the moral 
hazard effect from the “real hazard” effect of IMF interventions.   
There are alternative approaches focusing on variables other than interest rates or 
market spreads.    Haldane and Scheibe (2003) consider the effect of IMF loans on market 
capitalization of UK banks with significant exposures to emerging markets.    A change in 
market valuation of the creditor banks is considered to capture the (unexpected) change in 
price incentives for creditors to engage in future risky lending to emerging market 
economies that are expected to be subject to IMF intervention.    Regression analysis shows 
that the market valuation of U.K. banks responds positively to major IMF loan packages. 
They interpret this finding as evidence for the existence of creditor moral hazard in the ㄱ
sense that the increase in net worth of the banks can suggest an increase in potential risk-
taking behavior, in response to large-scale IMF interventions. 
Gai and Taylor (2003) investigate whether an increase in the availability of 
financing under an IMF-supported program induced debtor behavior of risk-taking.    They 
test if IMF program participation of member countries has varied with new policy measures 
such as Supplemental Reserve Facility (SRF) and New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB) 
that were designed to facilitate financial rescues.    They find that the introduction of NAB 
and SRF has significantly increased the use of IMF resources, particularly by the debtor 
countries that are more ‘systematically important,’ that is, more susceptible to the risk of 
contagion.    This framework has an advantage of avoiding the complexities posed by the 
use of asset prices by measuring debtor’s behavior directly.    However, it is not clear that 
the introduction of NAB and SRF is purely an exogenous event.    These financial facilities 
were introduced to provide larger-scale, short-term financing to mitigate the shock of a 
capital account crisis.    Then, debtors might have realized the increase in perceived risk.   
That is, an increase in IMF program participation following the introduction of new policy 
measures can be a result of increased real hazard, rather than debtor moral hazard. 
 
III. Empirical Test for Moral Hazard 
 
In this section we introduce a new test procedure that builds on the work of Dell’Ariccia et 
al. (2002).    Unlike their test statistics that focus on overall moral hazard irrespective of 
countries, our test procedure emphasizes that the degree of moral hazard prevailing might ㄲ
differ across countries.   
 
1.  Setup of the model 
 
We follow a setup similar to that used in Dell’Ariccia et al. that investigates how the 
existence of international financial institutions aggravates investor moral hazard.    There 
are a number of risk-neutral lenders who make loans to debtor countries.    There are only 
two states for the debtor countries: they suffer from a crisis or they do not.    The 
probability of a crisis for country i is denoted as  () i x θ   which is expressed as a function of 
a vector of observable country-specific fundamentals,  i x .    If a crisis occurs, a country can 
default with probability, (1 i λ − ).    In other words, the lenders can recover the debt with the 
recovery rate,  i λ , even after the occurrence of the crisis.    This is because the international 
financial institution rescues the crisis country and pays back the debt on behalf of the crisis 
country.
4    Note that we assume that the recovery rate varies across countries. 
      The introduction of insurance provided by the international financial institution is 
denoted as z.    The provision of more insurance can be reflected in the setup through three 
different channels.    First, it might affect observable fundamentals, i.e.,  ) (z x x i i = , and 
hence indirectly affect the crisis probability, i.e.,  )) ( ( z xi θ .  This  channel  represents 
debtor-country moral hazard in that as more insurance is provided, the debtor country may 
take more risky actions that deteriorate fundamentals and hence indirectly raise the 
†††††††††††††††††††††
This is a strong assumption because international rescue packages do not invariably involve the bailout of 
the international investors.    It was the tradition that the IMF did not lend to countries that were in default or 
arrears to their private investors.    However the IMF changed its practices in the mid-1980s to formally adopt 
a policy that explicitly allowed it to lend to countries in arrears.ㄳ
probability of the crisis.    The second channel is a direct influence of the insurance on the 
probability of a financial crisis, i.e.,  (( ) ,) i x zz θ .    This direct channel is interpreted as real 
crisis reduction due to the beneficial role of international crisis lending by preventing or 
mitigating a crisis.    For example, as more insurance is provided, this increased safety net 
might reduce the probability of self-fulfilling runs on a country’s debt or currency.   
Alternatively, the international lending may provide the vulnerable country with the hard 
currency necessary to implement the domestic financial safety nets or prevent bank runs.   
Then the probability of a crisis alters independently of the changes in fundamentals.
5  T h e  
third channel is through its influence on the recovery rate.    As the international financial 
institution tends to bail out the crisis country more frequently, the probability of perceived 
recovery rate rises, i.e.,  ) (z i λ   increases.    While investor moral hazard refers to particular 
investor actions such as an increase in risky lending or a reduction in monitoring, data on 
investor actions are typically not available.    However, since the increased recovery rate 
would have precisely this effect in the sense that it allows the investors to make more risky 
investments, this channel is often used to detect investor moral hazard.     
  Given this setup, we can easily relate the crucial parameters to the spreads of the 
risky lending rate of the debtor countries over the risk-free rate.    Then, by analyzing how 
an introduction of more or less insurance provided by the international institution affects 
these spreads, we can indirectly infer the sense of moral hazard occurring to either investors 
or debtor countries.     
†††††††††††††††††††††
Alternatively we could assume that the lessening of real hazard occurs through improvement of 
fundamentals, in which case the distinction between debtor-country moral hazard and real hazard can be made 
by noting if fundamentals deteriorate or improve.    Since we focus on investor moral hazard, we can safely 
ignore this alternative channel that may unnecessarily complicate the analyses.   ㄴ
For the risk-neutral investors, the ex ante gross lending rate to country i,  i R , is 












     ( 1 )  
where 
f R   is the gross risk-free interest rate.    Then, the respective spread over the risk-
free rate for country i is: 
 
   ) 1 ( ln ln i i
f
i i R R s λ θ − ≅ − ≅      (2) 
where we make appropriate approximations, ln (1+ε) = ε.  
Equation (2) shows that the spread is equal to the crisis probability,  i θ , multiplied 
by the perceived default rate, 1- i λ .    Thus, spreads of the lending rate over the risk-free 
rate depend on two factors: the crisis probability and the recovery rate.    These two factors 
are also related to the degree of moral hazard occurring to debtor countries and investors. 
Since changes in real hazard are also related to the crisis probability, under our assumptions, 
we focus on the behavior of the recovery rate so as to assess the degree of investor moral 
hazard.    Concentrating on the direction of changes in spreads, however, cannot 
unambiguously determine the presence of investor moral hazard.    For example, if the 
degree of investor moral hazard increases (that is,  i λ  increases),  spreads  decrease, 
reflecting that the risk premium required to investors decreases as the perceived likelihood 
of the international rescue increases.    At the same time, if the degree of debtor-country 
moral hazard increases ( i θ   increases), spreads increase, reflecting that the risk premium 
increases as the crisis probability increases.    In an extreme case, the level of spreads does ㄵ
not change if moral hazards that are greatly reinforced on both sides are exactly cancelled 
out.    However, if there is no direct effect of international crisis lending on the real hazard 
of default, the direction of changes in the level of spreads can provide a clue to the 
qualitative answer.    For example, if the level of spreads increases, we can assure that the 
debtor country moral hazard dominates investor moral hazard and vice versa.  However, 
even in this case, we cannot estimate the quantitative increase in the degree of moral hazard 
on either side because the alteration in spreads reflects the different degrees of moral 
hazards that are simultaneously working in the opposite directions. 
In order to disentangle the factor of investor moral hazard, we note that in equation 
(2) the sensitivity of spreads to the crisis probability depends on the degree of investor 
moral hazard.    As the degree of investor moral hazard increases (that is,  i λ  increases), 
the coefficient of the default probability decreases.    This is the idea pursued by 
Dell’Ariccia et al. (2002) in focusing on the slope coefficient instead of the level of spreads 
in order to determine whether investor moral hazard increases or not.    Since the slope 
coefficient is directly related to the recovery rate parameter (λ ), its estimation can provide 
the quantitative estimate for the increase in the degree of investor moral hazard.    This can 
be shown by expressing equation (2) as follows:   
 
i i i u x s + = β       ( 3 )  
where the error term,  i u , is explicitly added and  i θ   is assumed to take a linear form and 
be mingled into β.
6    The vector of observable fundamentals,  i x , appears directly and 
†††††††††††††††††††††
A constant term is suppressed for the expositional convenience. ㄶ
reflects the risk factors that influence the crisis probability,  i θ .  An  increase  in  i x  is 
supposed to increase the risk factors.    The slope parameter, β, is assumed to reflect the 
degree of investor moral hazard that influences the perceived default rate, 1- i λ . 
Dell’Ariccia et al.’s strategy is to estimate equation (3) before and after an event 
that changes the way international crisis lending is provided.    If this change leads to a 
different degree of investor moral hazard, basically the slope parameter, β, will reflect this 
change.    By estimating the slope parameter, they argue that any change in the degree of 
investor moral hazard can be detected.    They take the Russian default as an event that 
signals that the perceived likelihood of future international crisis lending is lessened, while 
the Mexican and Asian crises are taken as events that signal the opposite.    They consider 
an increase in β after the Russian crisis, that is, spreads becoming more sensitive to risk 
factors after less insurance is provided by the international financial institution, as evidence 
of investor moral hazard prevailing before the crisis.    They also consider a decrease in β 
after the Mexican and Asian crises as evidence of investor moral hazard prevailing more 
afterwards.    Their actual empirical results show evidence of investor moral hazard in the 
event of the Russian crisis but not in that of the Mexican and Asian crises.     
We extend the basic setup of equation (3) by explicitly allowing the recovery rate 
to vary across countries.    As will be explained in detail in the next subsection, the 
likelihood of receiving an IMF loan hinges on the member country’s political connections 
to the U.S. and other major shareholding countries of the IMF, as well as on various country 
characteristics.    We will show that introducing the varying recovery rate greatly enhances ㄷ
the fit of the equation.
7 
More importantly, relaxing the assumption of the constant recovery rate allows a 
new method of testing investor moral hazard.    As the approval rate increases across 
different countries, since bailout is more likely, investors should be less sensitive to the risk 
factors if investor moral hazard prevails.    Then investor moral hazard is detected by 
examining whether the slope coefficient of spreads also changes in line with the varying 
recovery rate.    In other words, we can be assured that investor moral hazard prevails if the 
slope coefficient for countries more likely to be bailed out is lower than that for countries 
less likely to be bailed out.    In fact, the different recovery rate across countries is 
analogous to introducing events altering the overall likelihood of lending provided by the 
international financial institution.    While existing studies including Dell’Ariccia et al. 
focus on an event that would alter the slope coefficient of all countries by changing the 
overall likelihood of lending, our test investigates if the slope coefficient varies across 
countries as the likelihood of lending differs across countries.    Our slope test procedure is 
especially useful, as we can analyze the dataset for a relatively short time period that does 
not correspond to the event that alters the general atmosphere of the international lending.   
Furthermore, we do not need to worry about the possibility that the event may affect overall 
real hazard as well.   
Our test procedure can also mimic exactly that used by Dell’Ariccia et al.    For 
example, after an event alters the overall insurance provided by the international financial 
†††††††††††††††††††††
Dell’Ariccia et al. actually show that even if they allow the recovery rate to depend on the fundamentals, 
under some circumstances, their proposition still follows.    However, in our setup we allow the recovery rate 
to depend not only on the fundamentals but also on political connections to the IMF. ㄸ
institution, the slope coefficient of every country changes.    By comparing the slope 
coefficient for every country across before and after the event, we can also assess if the 
event affects the degree of investor moral hazard or not. 
Our test procedure starts with the following modification of equation (3):
8 
 
i i i i i i i i u z x x u z x s + + = + + = 1 0 1 0 ) ( β β β β    (4) 
where the recovery rate is explicitly modeled to vary as  i z   changes across countries.   
The parameter  i z   measures the likelihood of IMF bailouts for each country given the 
country fundamentals.    We derive the proxy for  i z   based on the recent work by Barro 
and Lee (2004) that investigates how a country’s political connections to the IMF as well as 
other characteristics affect the probability and size of IMF lending.    The parameter,  i z , 
will be defined so that a country with higher  i z   is more likely to obtain IMF loans.    Then 
the evidence of investor moral hazard is detected by focusing on the slope coefficient of i x . 
For example, if investor moral hazard is aggravated, then the slope coefficient of  i x  will 
be lowered in absolute value or equivalently 1 β   will take a different sign from 0 β  so  that 
the slope coefficient,  i z 1 0 β β + , decreases in absolute value (i.e., is less responsive to the 
country fundamentals) as  i z  rises.
9    The test of Dell’Ariccia et al. also implies that the 
estimate of  i z 1 0 β β + , becomes smaller following an event that increases overall insurance 
†††††††††††††††††††††
8  The model can be extended by allowing that the likelihood of IMF bailouts can have a direct effect on the 
level of spread, independently from the effect on the slope coefficient.    The specification can be expressed as,   
i i i i i i u z z x x s + + + = δ β β 1 0    (4)’ 
The main empirical results reported below hold true in this alternative specification.   
While it is desirable to define all the risk factor variables,  i x , consistently in such a way that a higher 
value implies a higher risk, some risk factor variables we use in the actual estimation are defined as they 
change inversely with the risk. In either case, however, a lower coefficient in absolute value implies less 
sensitivity to the risk factor. ㄹ
provided by the international financial institution.     
  
2.    IMF Governance and Lending Decision   
 
To introduce the varying recovery rate, it is essential to analyze the IMF decision 
process to provide loans to crisis countries.    In fact, the decision on participation in an 
IMF program can be determined endogenously by various factors.
10  The participation in an 
IMF program is a joint decision between a particular country and the IMF which requires 
the agreement of both.    On the demand side, a country seeks IMF financial assistance 
when it faces certain economic difficulties.    For example, a currency crisis induces 
countries to seek IMF financial support.   
On the supply side, the decision of the IMF to provide loans depends on the current 
economic situation of the country and its past economic performance.    The IMF evaluates 
the country’ economic circumstances in order to determine if a lending program is 
warranted.    The IMF also evaluates whether the country is committed to undertake any 
conditions that the IMF will impose.   
Barro and Lee (2004) introduce another political-economy dimension of IMF 
decision-making, and show that a country’s political connections to the IMF affect the 
probability and size of IMF lending.    They proxy the political connections by several 
institutional and geopolitical variables: the size of the country’s quota at the IMF, the size 
of the national staff at the IMF, and each member country’s economic and political 
†††††††††††††††††††††
10  See Bird and Rowlands (2001), Bird et al. (2004) and Barro and Lee (2004) for determinants of IMF loans. ㈰
proximity to the major shareholding countries of the IMF, including the United States, 
France, Germany and the United Kingdom.    The proximity variables are constructed based 
on patterns of voting in the U.N. General Assembly and bilateral trade flows. 
Table 1 reports the estimation result, which is reproduced from the finding of Barro 
and Lee (2004, Table 3).    The dependent variable is the ratio of approved IMF loans to 
GDP for country i, averaged over the five-year period 1975-79, 1980-84, 1985-89, 1990-94, 
or 1995-99.    By taking account of the censoring of the dependent variable at zero, the 
Tobit model is applied to panel data for 130 countries over the five five-year periods from 
1975 to 1999.    The explanatory variables include country-specific economic factors that 
influence the existence and size of IMF loan programs such as the ratio of foreign reserves 
to imports, per capita GDP, total GDP, and per capita GDP growth rate.    They are the 
values at the beginning of the period or an average over the previous five-year period.    In 
addition, the regression includes the institutional and geopolitical factors that measure each 
country’s political-economy connections to the IMF.    The regression also includes period 
dummies and a dummy for OECD membership. The regression result in Table 1 shows the 
significant influence of economic factors, as well as political and institutional factors, over 
the size of IMF lending.    All of the political-economy variables are jointly statistically 
significant.    More detailed discussion of the results is available in Barro and Lee (2004). 
  Based on the estimation result, we can construct the predicted value of the loan-
size for the five-year period from 1995 to 1999.    Table 2 reports the estimate for the 
predicted loan size based on the regression result in Table 1. This variable is constructed for ㈱
the 16 EMBI Global countries (EMBIG) included in our data set.
11 Venezuela  (1.23), 
Mexico (1.18), South Africa (1.15), Philippines (1.08) and Panama (1.07) comprise the 
group of the highest five countries, while Korea (0.48), China (0.66), Thailand (0.69), 
Argentina (0.73) and Brazil (0.78) are the lowest five countries.   
 
3.  Empirical test for investor moral hazard based on spreads 
 
In the literature, two different sources for bond spreads are widely used: the launch 
spreads contained in Capital Data’s “Bondware” dataset and the secondary-market spreads 
included in J.P. Morgan’s Emerging Markets Bond Index (EMBI). While Capital Data’s 
“Bondware” dataset covers broadly 54 emerging countries, it contains primary spreads that 
are observed only at the time of issue.    This creates a complicated problem because it 
constitutes a highly unbalanced panel.    Since the decision of issuance is likely to depend 
on the factors that influence the level of spreads as well, a simple OLS estimation of 
spreads is vulnerable to a selection bias.
12  
On the other hand, the EMBI or the EMBI+ datasets cover only a small number of 
countries.    A more recent dataset, EMBI Global, covers a much broader set of 18 
emerging countries, but only for a much shorter period starting from January 1998.    This 
dataset has an important advantage, however, because it consists of a balanced panel based 
on secondary market spreads at daily frequency.    The instruments are mainly Brady bonds 
†††††††††††††††††††††
ㄱ Among the 18 countries considered in Dell’Ariccia et al., Bulgaria and Croatia are not included because 
some variables necessary to calculate the predicted values are not available.
12  Eichengreen and Mody (2004) get around this problem by employing a two-step equation of a sample 
selection model. ㈲
and Eurobonds, but a small number of trade loans and local market instruments are 
contained in the calculation of the weighted average index.   
To avoid the complicated econometric issue, we have decided to choose the EMBI 
Global dataset for our empirical analyses.    The major event during the coverage of the 
dataset is the Russian crisis.    While Russia was widely believed to be “too big to fail,” 
somewhat surprisingly, the international community did not prevent the default.    This can 
be interpreted to signal that the policy of international financial institutions changed to 
provide less support to crisis countries.    A number of previous studies including 
Dell’Ariccia et al. (2002) focus on this changing behavior of investors to compare moral 
hazard before and after the crisis.   
Following the Russian crisis, since a period of prolonged turbulence continued for a 
while, the period immediate after the crisis should be excluded from the post-crisis period 
for a fair comparison with the pre-crisis period.    Otherwise, the estimated coefficients that 
are supposedly derived from a static model of stable relationship between spreads and 
fundamentals tend to be contaminated by the highly unstable turbulence period around the 
time of the crisis.    One difficulty with this approach, however, is that there is no objective 
way to determine the exclusion period and an error in this determination may generate a 
biased result.    To compare our empirical analyses with those of Dell’Ariccia et al., we 
follow their choice of the pre-crisis period from January to June 1998 and the post-crisis 
period from April 1999 to December 2000.    The data frequency used is monthly.             
Before we present the results based on the test procedure devised in this paper, Table 3 
shows pre- and post-Russian crisis regression results based on equation (3) that were ㈳
utilized by Dell’Ariccia et al. We choose the control variables that are used in the most 
preferred specification in Dell’Ariccia et al.
13  The results under Sample 1 are based on the 
whole set of 18 emerging countries and are identical to those reported in Dell’Ariccia et al.   
Since our new test procedure requires the Barro-Lee index that is used as a proxy for  i z , 
our sample discards two countries, Bulgaria and Croatia, due to a lack of data involved with 
construction of the Barro-Lee index.    For the comparison later, the results under Sample 2 
are based on the set of 16 emerging countries only.    However the two results are very 
similar and hence our explanations below can be applied to both results. 
When the slope coefficients of the risk factors are compared between pre- and post-
crisis regression results, although the magnitude of the change is not always statistically 
significant, the absolute value of most of the coefficients increases.    Dell’Ariccia et al. 
(2002) take this finding as supporting evidence for the prevailing of investor moral hazard 
before the Russian crisis.    However, the coefficients of some variables have the wrong 
sign, which makes the interpretation of their test  results  difficult.  For  example,  the 
coefficient of current account surplus is positive, which implies that a country’s spread will 
increase if its current account surplus increases.    However, if the crisis probability is 
inversely related to the volume of current account surplus, the coefficient should be 
negative.  Another  example  is  the  coefficient  of real credit growth, which is estimated to 
be negative in contradiction to the expectation.   
Now we switch to our preferred specification of equation (4) in which differences 
in the approval rate across countries are explicitly  considered.  Table  4  reports  the 
†††††††††††††††††††††
13  See table 5 in Dell’Ariccia et al. (2002).†They selected this specification through a general-to-specific 
procedure using a rich right-hand side dataset. ㈴
estimation results.    For each risk factor variable, the coefficient of the interaction term 
with the predicted loan-size is reported below it.    In both columns of table 4, reporting 
pre- and post-crisis results, the Barro-Lee index is found to be quite relevant in determining 
spreads since, in most cases, the coefficients of the interaction terms are statistically very 
significant.    Further, the coefficients of the variables with the wrong sign are converted 
into the right one; i.e., the coefficient of current account surplus becomes negative and that 
of real credit growth, positive.    Thus the overall fit of the specification improves by 
adding up the interactive terms with the predicted loan-size variable.    This is also 
confirmed by the fact that 
2
R   is higher than before. 
In the new specification, investor moral hazard is detected by assessing whether the 
slope coefficient of risk factors decreases in absolute value as  i z  increases.  In  other 
words, if investors respond less sensitively to the risk factors of a country that is more 
likely to be bailed out by the IMF, we can be assured that investor moral hazard prevails.   
Since the slope coefficient is the sum of the coefficients of the risk factors and the 
corresponding interaction term, an equivalent way is to check if the coefficient of the latter 
takes the opposite sign to that of the former.     
As explained, our method has an advantage in that it can be applied to each sub-
sample period separately.    We first examine the regression results for the pre-crisis period. 
Column 1 depicts a general pattern that the coefficients of interaction terms take the 
opposite sign from those of the corresponding risk factor variables, consistent with the 
assertion that investor moral hazard prevailed.    The only exception is the current account 
for which the coefficient of the interaction term is statistically insignificant.   ㈵
For the post-crisis period, while relatively more variables are not statistically 
significant, the same pattern emerges of the opposite sign between the coefficients of the 
risk factors and those of the corresponding interaction terms.    For example, real growth, 
fiscal balance and political instability are not statistically  significant.  However,  for  other 
variables such as current account, real credit growth, and size variables that are statistically 
significant, we observe the same pattern as before.    Hence, the overall evidence seems to 
support the hypothesis that bond spreads of a country which is more likely to be bailed out 
by the IMF tend to be less responsive to the country fundamentals.    Thus, we can conclude 
that the moral hazard also prevailed even after the Russian crisis. 
One of the main findings of Dell’Ariccia et al. is that moral hazard decreased in 
general after the Russian crisis. Do our analyses support this conclusion?    This issue can 
be investigated by comparing the slope coefficients before and after the crisis.    Since the 
value of the slope coefficients depends not only on the coefficients of the risk factors and 
the interaction terms, but also the actual value of  i z , it is convenient to represent this 
comparison for the range of the entire support of  i z .    When we compare the pre- and the 
post-crisis periods for the risk factor, it is not always clear whether investor moral hazard 
has increased or not.    For example, when we use the point estimates in column (1), the 
slope coefficients of real credit growth indicate that the slope (that is, the response of 
spread to credit growth) becomes uniformly larger in the entire support of  i z  after  the 
crisis, demonstrating that investor moral hazard became less prevailing after the crisis. 
However, for the other variables, the changes in the slopes are ambiguous and depend on 
the value of  i z . ㈶
Overall, our evidence indicates that the Russian default may not necessarily have 
decreased investor moral hazard.    Instead, our evidence seems to suggest that, irrespective 
of the time period, investor moral hazard prevails in those countries that are more likely to 
be bailed out by international financial institutions such as the IMF.   
 
V. Concluding Remarks   
 
Ever since the large-scale IMF bailouts for Mexico in 1994 and East Asia in 1997-
98, countless proposals for the “new international financial architecture” have been put 
forward.
14  In line with this, attention has focused on how to change the role of the IMF to 
increase its effectiveness in managing financial crises and also on how to limit the moral 
hazard associated with IMF bailouts.  
The increasing incidence of large-scale financial crises and the rapid global 
transmission of each crisis support the case for an international lender of last resort (ILLR) 
(Kindleberger 1989, Fischer 1999).    The scale of capital outflows when a crisis breaks out 
has continued to increase in recent years, thereby substantially raising the cost of each crisis. 
The herd behavior exhibited by investors often triggers a severe liquidity crisis in a country.   
In this regard, an international institution such as the IMF can play a desirable role by 
enabling an illiquid but solvent country to survive and by stemming the contagion of the 
crisis to neighbor countries. 
However, expanding the role of the IMF as a stronger ILLR would undoubtedly 
†††††††††††††††††††††
14  Refer to De Gregorio et al. (1999), Eichengreen (1999) and Park and Wang (2001) among others for the 
discussion of new international financial architecture. ㈷
create a large moral hazard problem, raising expectations of more frequent interventions by 
the IMF with a larger scale of financial support than at present. Such an increased-scale of 
IMF-led bailouts has certainly lead to excessive borrowing and lending.    A large IMF 
could become more actively engaged in preventative monitoring and early supervision of 
financial activity, which might help to reduce the problem of moral hazard but cannot 
completely eliminate it. 
Our empirical finding shows that investor moral hazard still prevails, even after the 
Russian default that supposedly signaled a different stance on IMF’s role as an ILLR.   
Hence, investments in countries that are likely to be excessive beneficiaries of the ILLR are 
subject to moral hazard behavior.    Even if it were possible to succeed in reforming the 
general structure, the IMF would not be able to prevent its major shareholders, like the 
United States, from seeking to “bail-out” countries that have stronger political connections.   
This raises a concern that, as long as this favoritism continues, moral hazard may not be 
significantly mitigated.   
Therefore, when we discuss the role of the IMF as an ILLR, the governance 
structure of the institution, and in particular the decision-making procedure with respect to 
the approval of rescue loans, should be critically examined.    Otherwise, any attempt to 
promote the role of the IMF as an ILLR along the lines of current policy prescriptions is 
merely likely to heighten the moral hazard problem inherent in the system.   
Private-sector involvement (PSI) has also been a hot issue in the recent discussions 
on the international financial architecture. In order to reduce creditor moral hazard, there 
have been suggestions of “bailing-in” the private sector, which implies that investors should ㈸
bear part of the burden. One proposal involves empowering the IMF to function as a sort of 
“international bankruptcy court” which can impose payment standstills (Krueger 2001).    A 
payment standstill could compel creditors to act collectively in their best interests, and thus 
help to avoid a disruptive asset-grabbing race (Sachs, 1995).    If the payment standstill 
scheme proves viable, the government and the IMF can declare debt standstill as an 
alternative to a large-scale loan for a country, particularly in a liquidity crisis.   
In the recent discussion of PSI, its facilitation of orderly debt restructuring in the 
event of a crisis has been much emphasized, whereas its role in preventing moral hazard 
has received little consideration.    PSI would help to mitigate the investor moral hazard 
associated with IMF bailouts.    However, the current proposals for PSI would actually 
increase the moral hazard behavior from the debtor side. 
Our empirical analysis focuses on moral hazard from the investor side.    It remains 
an interesting and important issue as to whether the expectation of IMF bailouts encourages 
borrowing countries, especially those closely connected to the IMF, to behave imprudently 
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Table 1.    Tobit Estimation of IMF Loan Size 
 
  Coefficient P-value 
Per capita GDP growth rate  -0.057  0.006 
International reserves  -0.122  0.003 
GDP per capita  0.173  0.068 
GDP per capita squared  -0.0238  0.008 
Log (GDP)    0.563  0.118 
Log (GDP) squared  -0.048  0.041 
Group of advanced OECD countries  -0.605  0.444 
Log (IMF quota)  0.965  0.010 
Log (IMF staff)  0.170  0.050 
Political proximity to the U.S.  -0.040  0.909 
Political proximity to major European countries 0.849  0.055 
Intensity of trade with the U.S.  0.185  0.005 
Intensity of trade with major European 
countries 
0.028 0.745 
Number of observations.  613 
Wald Chi-2(17)  28.98 
P>Chi-2 0.035 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the ratio of IMF loan to GDP, averaged over the five five-year periods 1975-
1979, 1980-1984,…,1995-1999.    A Tobit model was applied to the panel data for these periods. Period 
dummies are included (not shown).    Robust standard errors of the estimated coefficients are reported in 
parentheses. This result is reconstructed from Barro and Lee (2004, Table 3, Column 6). Please refer to their 
paper for a detailed discussion of the variables, the estimation technique, and the results.     
 ㌳
 
Table 2. Estimated Size of IMF Lending, 1995-1999 
  
Country Loan/GDP  (%)  Rank 
Venezuela  1.23 1 
Mexico  1.18 2 
South Africa  1.15 3 
Philippines  1.08 4 
Panama  1.07 5 
Morocco  0.97 6 
Malaysia  0.92 7 
Poland  0.89 8 
Turkey  0.89 9 
Peru  0.84 10 
Colombia  0.83 11 
Brazil  0.78 12 
Argentina  0.73 13 
Thailand  0.69 14 
China  0.66 15 
Korea, Rep.  0.48 16 
 
Note: The estimates are the predicted value of the loan-size for the five-year period from 1995 to 1999, based 
on the regression results in Table 1.   ㌴
Table 3. Spreads Estimation with the Constant Recovery Rate   
 
  Sample 1  Sample 2 
  Before crisis After crisis Before crisis After crisis
Variable Coef.  p  Coef. p  Coef. p  Coef.  p 
Constant 3195.0  0.00  1474.0 0.00 3152.2 0.00  1478.3  0.00 
Real growth  -3.83  0.00  -10.02 0.00 -6.83 0.00  -10.64  0.00 
Fiscal balance  -21.26  0.00  -29.93 0.00 -23.77 0.00  -36.08  0.00 
Current account    0.75  0.79  7.17 0.01 4.78 0.13  15.38  0.13 
Real credit growth  -2.77  0.00  -5.83 0.00 -2.01 0.00  -4.64  0.00 
Political instability  11.42  0.40  14.44 0.27 11.84 0.94  27.11  0.03 
Size (log GDP in 1993)  -35.75  0.00  -40.01 0.00 -33.65 0.00  -43.98  0.00 
Rating (residual)  -39.33  0.00  -51.38 0.00 -39.33 0.00  -49.16  0.00 
US ten-year yield  -447.1  0.00  -97.0 0.00 -444.9 0.00  -96.8  0.00 
Asia dummy  72.39  0.01  -79.54 0.00 83.45 0.00  -68.62  0.00 
Latin dummy  151.1  0.00  227.3 0.00 174.2 0.00  275.0  0.00 
No. of countries    18   16  
R Squared    0.965   0.970  
Notes: 1) Estimated on pooled sample 1998:01 – 2000:12, excluding 1998:07 – 1999:03, and allowing for different coefficients for pre-
and post-crisis periods. All estimations use robust standard errors. 
2) Before crisis refers to the period of 1998:01 – 1998:06 
3) After crisis refers to the period of 1999:04 – 2000:12 
4) Sample 1 includes the full sample of 18 countries consisting of Argentina, Brazil, China, Colombia, Korea , Malaysia, Mexico, 
Morocco, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey and Venezuela.. Sample 2 excludes two countries, Bulgaria 
and Croatia, due to the lack of the data involved with construction of the Barro-Lee index 
5) The results under sample 1 are identical to those of the alternative specification reported in Table 5 in Dell’Ariccia et al. (2002) ㌵
Table 4. Spreads Estimation with the Varying Recovery Rate 
  Before crisis  After crisis 
Variable Coef. p  Coef.  p 
Constant 3489.3 0.000  1375.1  0.000 
Real growth  -16.11 0.027  7.49  0.439 
Real growth* i z   10.60 0.215  -17.84  0.111 
Fiscal balance  -307.96 0.000  -87.08  0.107 
Fiscal balance* i z   273.20 0.000  49.47  0.426 
Current account    -5.53 0.752  -62.66  0.001 
Current account*  i z   -14.98 0.406  74.37  0.000 
Real credit growth  42.17 0.000  14.57  0.049 
Real credit growth*  i z   -43.86 0.000  -16.75  0.053 
Political instability  1614.38 0.000  34.53  0.895 
Political instability* i z   -1760.16 0.000  15.49  0.960 
Size (log GDP in 1993)  -153.93 0.000  -74.99  0.000 
Size (log GDP in 1993)*  i z   52.07 0.000  35.77  0.000 
Rating (residual)  -66.27 0.001  -53.68  0.036 
Rating (residual)*  i z   24.57 0.278  24.83  0.373 
US ten-year yield  -390.84 0.000  -99.08  0.000 
Asia dummy  134.27 0.000  5.14  0.858 
Latin dummy  109.4 0.000  249.5  0.000 
No. of countries  16   16   
R Squared  0.9758   0.9758   
Note:  i z refers to the predicted loan size value. See notes to Table 3. 